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STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES
STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES TO THE JURY-THEIR NATURE
AND PURPOSE-COURT'S DISCRETION RELATIVE TO THEIR SUB-
MISSION.-The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
has recently considered, on a writ of error, a case in which
-the plaintiff brought an action for trespass, and recovered
judgment for one hundred seventy-five dollars, against
the defendant company. The acts of which the plaintiff
complained were the construction of a drain from the de-
fendant's mine to the surface in such a manner that it
caused the plaintiff's land to be overflowed; and the erec-
tion of power poles on his property-both acts being done
without right. The appellate court, in its opinion, casually
mentions that "Interrogatories answered by the jury show
that $150 was assessed for damages because of the drain,
and $25 for damage because of the power poles."1  The
court did not condemn, nor even comment upon the pro-
priety of submitting, these interrogatories. Yet it is quite
apparent that there is no conceivable answer that the jury
might have returned to them which would negative the
plaintiff's rights to recover; and it seems that the purpose
of propounding these questions must have been to secure
from the jury an itemization of the damages assessed. And
such a purpose flies in the face of the construction which
the Supreme Court has repeatedly placed upon the West
Virginia statute authorizing the rendition of special ver-
dicts or of special findings of fact, in addition to a general
verdict. Apparently, in handing down its recent decision,
the attention of the court was not called to its line of cases
construing the statute.
It is well settled that, even in the absence of statute, a
court, in the exercise of its discretion, has the power of
submitting proper special interrogatories to the jury, but
the practice is almost entirely statutory in its origin and
development.2 The Massachusetts trial, court resorted, at
an early day, to the device of special questions in instances
I Armstrong v. Pinnacle Coal & Coke Co., 101 W. Va. 15, 131 S. E. 712 (1926).
2 27 R. C. L. 866.
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where it was surprised by the jury's verdict and was desir-
ous of determining upon what ground or grounds it was
based.3 The practice of asking special questions appeared
in New York even before that state adopted its code of civil
procedure, in 1848, 4 which code authorized the continuance of
the practice ;5 and since then it has spread to many other
states.6 The right of a court t.o question the jury spe-
cially in this regard has been denied in England. 7
Our West Virginia statute in point which was enacted by
Acts of 1872-3, as amended in 1875 and 1882, provides (in
part) :
"The court may on motion of any party direct the jury,
in addition to rendering a general verdict, to render sep-
arate verdicts upon any one or more of the issues, or to
find in writing upon particular questions of fact to be
stated in writing. The action of the court upon such
motions shall be subject to review as in other cases.
Where any such separate verdict or special findings shall
be inconsistent with the general verdict, the former shall
control the latter, and the court shall give judgment ac-
cordingly." s
How has the West Virginia Court interpreted this enact-
ment? Has it been held proper to submit special interro-
gatories to the jury for the purpose of an itemization of
damages, to show that excessive damages have been
assessed as to one item, when such fact would not appear
from a general verdict, so as-to scale down the amount of the
recovery, or lay the basis for a motion for a new trial,
without, however, eliciting an answer going to the merits
of the action, and thus affecting the very right of recovery?
What attitude has the West Virginia Court taken, and is it
in line with the holdings of other states having similar code
provisions? These are the questions here presented for con-
sideration.
Turning first to the West Virginia decisions, one of the
earliest leading cases found on the subject is Peninsular Land
Transportation & Manufdcturing Company v. Franklin Insur-




O Supra, n. 8.
Su a. 8.
W. VA. CODE, C. 181, §5.
9 85 W. Va. 666, 14 S. E. 23'7 (1891).
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to ascertain one or more controlling facts, so that the exis-
tence or non-existence of some fact upon which the issue
turns may be expressly found and judgment rendered "ac-
cording to the truth and very right of 'the case;" and that
questions, the answers to which would be inconsistent or
immaterial, should be refused, -and that a finding which is
not "irreconcilably antagonistic to a general verdict for
the plaintiff" is immaterial. Judge Brannon, in Bess v. Ches-
apeake & Ohio Railroad Company,10 explains that "Before
this statute allowing special questions to the jury, the es-
sential matters of fact involved in a trial were wrapped up
in the general verdict; and it could not be told whether
each and all those essential facts were in fact, in the opin-
ion of the jury, found for the party prevailing;" and he
quotes the Kansas court as saying: "It is a matter of com-
mon knowledge that a jury, influenced by a general feel-
ing that one side ought to recover, will bring in a verdict
accordingly, when at the same time it will find a certain
fact to have been proved, which in law is an insuperable
barrier to a recovery in accord with the general verdict."
The Bess Case illustrates nicely a situation Where it is
proper to submit special interrogatories, the answers to
which are wholly irreconcilable to the general verdict and
go, not to the measure of damages, but to the very right
of recovery. Here, an action was brought against the rail-
road company for a wilful wrong of an employ6 in putting
a boy off a moving freight train, whereby he was injured;
and a general verdict was returned for the plaintiff, accom-
panied by a special finding that the boy was a trespasser
and not a passenger, and that the name and duties of the
employ6 were not found; and, therefore, it not being found
that the employ6 was acting within the scope of his author-
ity, where the boy was a trespasser, an essential element in
the defendant railroad company's liability was lacking and
made the general verdict improper.
Even prior to the cases discussed supra, the court, in Wheel-
ing Bridge Company v. Wheeling &Belmont Bridge Company n
had held it proper not to permit to be propounded a ques-
tion, the answer to which, if contrary to the general ver-
P9 85 W. Va. 492, 14 S. E. 234 (1891).
A 84 W. Va. 155, 11 S. E. 1009 (1890).
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dict, because of immateriality, would not be conclusive of
the verdict. And also, in the later case of yons v. Fairmont
Real Estate Company,12 the Supreme Court reiterates the
proposition that the trial court may properly refuse inter-
rogatories which are not so framed as to make an answer
to one or answers to all fatal to a general verdict against
the party asking for them, and entitle him to final judg-
ment on the special finding or findings if they are favor-
able to him; and that it was not the intent or purpose of
section 5, of chapter 131 of the Code, that the special
interrogatories should seek merely an itemization of the
damages assessed, on the assumption of an adverse general
verdict, or the disclosure of some other inconclusive fact,
so as to scale down the verdict, or lay the basis for a mo-
tion for a new trial. The trial court, in this instance, was
sustained in refusing nine interrogatories, five of them be-
ing either immaterial or inconclusive, and, of the others, the
court said: "The remaining four seek only an itemization
of damages, in case of liability. They do not go to the ques-
tion of liability at all. No combination of answers to all
of them would have pirecluded a recovery." The statute
was not intended to "permit any and all sorts of questions,
nor questions bearing upon material matters involved * * *
merely because of their materiality." Moreover, "it was
not intended to allow these interrogatories for the purpose
of finding some ground upon which to obtain a new trial for
insufficiency of the evidence as to some item of the demand
sued for or the like, but to enable the court to see whether
it shall give final judgment for the plaintiff or the defen-
dant." The court, in the Lyons Case, cites with approval
Wheeling Bridge Company v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge
Company,13 Kerr v. Lunsford,14 Bess v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Railway Company,15 and Peninsular Land Transportation
Manufacturing Company v. Franklin Insurance Company,"
and quotes from the latter decision, to the effect that
"the special findings, taken as a whole, must be clearly in-
consistent with the general verdict, and, to be inconsistent,
= 71 W. Va. 754, 77 S. E. 525 (1913).
u Supra, n. 11.
A' 31 W. Va. 659, 8 S. E. 493 (1888).
11 Supra. n. 10.
10 Sura, n. 9.
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they must clearly exclude every conclusion that would au-
thorize a verdict for the plaintiff."
Later, in Harmon v. Appalachian Power Company,17 and
consistently with the earlier adjudications, the court held
that it was not error for the trial court to refuse to submit
either of two interrogatories, an affirmative answer to one
of which would necessarily be a negative answer to the
other and decisive of the issue. Shortly thereafter, in
Griffith v. American Coal Company,18 the court, still adhtr-
ing to the construction which it had repeatedly put upon
the statute, regarded a question sought to be propounded
as immaterial, unless an answer thereto, if contrary to the
general verdict would control the latter and be conclusive;
and the court considered it not to be error to refuse to permit
particular questions, if immaterial or irrelevant, to be pro-
pounded, and sustained the lower court in its rejection of
such inconclusive interrogatories. Millan v. Bartlett,19 and
Ward v. Liverpool Salt & Coal Company,20 are decisions to the
same effect, the court in each instance holding that it is pro-
per to refuse interrogatories, which, whatever might be the
jury's finding thereon, would result in immaterial or incon-
clusive answers.
It was pointed out, in Runyan v. Kanawha Water & Light
Company,21 that a general verdict is not affected by an inter-
rogatory defective, in that it seeks the jury's opinion con-
cerning some matter involved, without asking as to the facts
upon which it is based; or, in other words, a question put
to ascertain the merely speculative opinion of the jury as to
what might or might not have been in a certain contingency,
should be refused.
In Brogan v. Union Traction Company,22 and in Glinco v.
Wimer,2 the court reaffirmed its former rulings as to the
propriety of declining to propound interrogatories raising
immaterial issues. And it has been held that it is the duty
of the court to harmonize the special findings with each
other and with the general verdict, corrected as to amount
1 71 W. Va. 48, 86 S. E. 917 (1916).
' 8 W. a. 34, 88 S. E. 595 (1916).
11'78 W. Va. 867, 89 S. E. 711 (1916).
079 W. Va. 371, 92 S. E. 92 (1917).
21 68W . Va. 609, 711 S. E. 259 (1911).
76 W. Va. 698, 86 S. E. 763 (1915).
88 W. Va. 508, 107 S. E. 198 (1921).
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br the special answers;24 and special findings will not over-
rule the general verdict, unless they are irreconcilably in-
consistent with the verdict and exclude all possibility of
harmonizing the special questions and the answers thereto
with the general verdict.2
Up to this point, as it has been noted, the construction
placed upon the statute has been constant and consistent
-that for special interrogatories to be properly submitted
to the jury, the answer thereto must be such as would go to
the very right of recovery, and being "irreconcilably in-
consistent" with the general verdict, would overcome and
be conclusive of it. But in The Virginian Tower Company v.
W. T. W. Brotherton et als,26 the court departed from its for-
mer unvarying construction of section 5, chapter 131 of the
Code. The proceeding in which the opinion was handed
down was a condemnation suit to take a strip of land and
eight or ten trees for a right of way. The highest value
placed on the land by any of the defendants was one hun-
dred twenty-five dollars per acre; and the trees taken were
valued at ten dollars each. A special finding of the jury,
on interrogatories propounded by the plaintiff company,
showed that seven hundred dollars were assessed for the
one and thirty-four-hundredths acres covered by the right
of way, one hundred fifty dollars for the trees taken, and
one hundred and fifty dollars as damages to the residue of
the land not taken, in regard to which latter item the Su-
preme Court mentioned that "many authorities say that
such elements of damages are too speculative and remote
to be considered in a condemnation proceeding." There
were several grounds urged on appeal, but "the principal
ground relied on for reversal is [was] that the verdict and
judgment are [were] excessive, considered in the light of the
evidence and the special finding of the jury on interrogatories
submitted to them on the application of the plaintiff." The
judgment was reversed and the case remanded. Here,
clearly the jury's response to the interrogatory did not go
to the right of recovery, but was intended merely to show
that the damages assessed in the general verdict were ex-
cessive, and thus lay the basis for a motion for a new trial;
21 Duckworth v. Stalnaker. 74 W. Va. 247, 81 S. E. 989 (1914).
15 Trobie v. Riter-Conley Co.. 89 W. Va. 123, 108 S. E. 596 (1921).
90 W. Va. 155, 110 S. E. 646 (1922).
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and that was the very thing which the court expressly
stated in Lyons v. Fairmont Real Estate Company,27 as well
as impliedly in other cases, should not be permitted. The suit
here was a condemnation proceeding, but it has not been sug-
gested that that fact, of itself, should make any difference in
this instance. And now in the recent case of Armstrong v.
Pinnacle Coal & Coke Company,28 the court accepts, without
remonstrance and as a matter of course, the submission of
interrogatories, to which no answer could possibly be given
which would affect the right of recovery. But in neither
The Virginian Power Company Case nor the Armstrong
Case was objection made to the interrogatories; if they had
been objected to, a contrary result might have been reached
in these two cases. Quite conceivably the West Virginian
statute is broad enough in the language in which it is phra-
sed, to cover the submission of interrogatories such as were
propounded in The Virginian Power Company and the
Armstrong Cases; but, as a matter of fact, the court had
previously put the more narrow construction upon the sta-
tute, and it was accepted as well established law. Whether
or not the latter two cases arrive 'at a better result than
would have been reached under the stricter rule of the
older decisions is an open question, but it must be conceded
that the court has changed its position in construing the
object to be effected by section 5, of chapter 131. The ear-
lier cases are correct, if it was the legislative intent that
the interrogatories should go only to the right of recovery;
but the later decisions are correct, if it was intended that
the interrogatories should go to the amount of recovery ..lso.
In turning one's attention to the reports of other courts to
ascertain the rules applied in foreign jurisdictions to the
use and effect of special interrogatories, it is well to remem-
ber that the submission of special questions is almost entire-
ly a statutory matter, which is little used, if at all, in some
states, and that where this procedural device is employed,
it is subject to local statutes varying in degree. In search-
ing through the reports, one finds that the practice of sub-
mitting special interrogatories is widespread, but is most
extensively employed in the states of the middle west and
2T Supra, n. 12.
23 Supra, n. 1.
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the southwest; and the practice seems to have reached vast
proportions, especially in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan,
Kansas, Iowa, Texas, and perhaps one or two other juris-
dictions. No attempt is made here to review the cases of
all the states, nor all the decisions of any one state bearing
on the subject of interrogatories, but merely to indicate
the high points of this phase of the law in a small number
of states, which may be taken as typical of the whole.
In the neighboring state of Ohio, the purpose of the sta-
tute has been adjudged to be that of eliciting from the jury
such special findings as test the correctness of the general
verdict and that is does not require submission to the jury
of questions merely for the purpose of ascertaining the
mental processes by which the jury arrived at their con-
clusions of fact.29 The "particular questions of fact" upon
which the jury may be directed to find specially are those
the answers to which will establish ultimate and determin-
ative facts, and not such as are only of probative charac-
ter ;30 but the court should allow the submission of special
questions, where the answers thereto will establish proba-
tive facts from which ultimate and controlling facts may
be inferred as a matter of law.81
Under the Indiana statute, it is held that interrogatories
which do not call for the finding of essential facts within
the issues are properly rejected.8 2 And in Southern Indiana
Railway Company v. Moore,88 the court refused to submit the
following interrogatories to the jury: "How much do you
find the value of the board of appellant's son from his death
until he was twenty-one years of age, had he lived?"; and
"How much do you find the value of the clothing of plain-
tiff's son from his death until he was twenty-one years of
age, had he lived?" Here, decedent was an infant living
with his mother; and the theory of the mother's suit was
that the railway company had directed her son to work in
an unsafe place. The court held that "in the refusal of
these questions there was no error, for the reason that in
actions for tort it is not proper to require the jury to item-
" Cleveland & E. Electric R. Co. v. Hawkins. 64 Oh. St. 891, 60 N. E. 658 (1001).
z' Schweinfurth v. Cleveland. etc. Ry. Co., 60 Oh. St. 215, 54 N. E. 89 (1899).
11 Gale v. Priddy, 66 Oh. St. 400, 64 N. E. 437 (1902).
2 People's State Bank v. Ruxer, 88 Ind. App. 420, '8 X. E. 387 (1906).
u 84 Ind. App. 154, 72 N. E. 479 (1904).
8
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ize the elements of damage." Again, in Farmers' Insurance
Association of Madison County v. Reavis,34 "appellees sued
appellant in two paragraphs." In paragraph No. 1, the
plaintiffs sought to recover on a fire insurance policy; while
in paragraph No. 2, recovery was sought on the basis of
an account stated. A general verdict was found for the
plaintiffs, accompanied by answers to several interrogato-
ries. The questions raised on appeal were based on the
trial court's order overruling the defendant's motion for
judgment in its favor on the special findings notwithstand-
ing the general verdict, and sustaining the plaintiff's mo-
tion for judgment on the general verdict. The jury had
answered an interrogatory, by saying that they found for
the plaintiff on the second paragraph. The appellate court
indicated that that interrogatory should not have beeni pro-
pounded to the jury, for the answer called for did not re-
late to a fact decisive of an issue of the cause, as the Indiana
statute contemplated. In another Indiana case, 35 the plain-
tiff, an infant, sought to recover for injuries resulting from
the alleged negligence of the defendant in lowering the
boom of a derrick; and the defendant tendered interroga-
tories for the jury to answer in case they returned a general
verdict for the plaintiff-Held, "The court properly refused
to submit these questions to the jury. The information. so
sought to be obtained was not such a 'question of fact' on
the issue of the cause as is contemplated by" the stat-
ute. Again, in an action for wrongful death brought by
the administrator, based upon negligence, the defendant
submitted six interrogatories to be answered, if the verdict
should be for the plaintiff, showing on what paragraph or
paragraphs it rested; and the trial court was sustained in
refusing them-"interrogatories for this purpose are not au-
"thorized by the statute." See also in accord, Clear Creek Stone
Company v. Dearmin8
In an action at law for damages from fraud and mis-
representation in the sale of a mill property, the defendant
tendered two special interrogatories, which were rejected.
On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court said: "These requests
were refused, and the ruling is, in our judgment, correct.
" 163 Ind. 821, 70 N. E. 518 (1904).
" Consolidated Stone Co. v. Morgan, 160 Ind. 241, 66 N. B. 696 (1903).
' 160 Ind. 162, 66 N. E. 609 (1903).
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Both interrogatories are compound, calling for findings on
several distinct propositions, and thereby tend to confuse
the jury. Neither do they call for the ultimate facts upon
which plaintiff's right of recovery depends * * *. The
damages claimed by plaintiff cannot be apportioned or
itemized, and, if he is entitled to recover, it is for the dam-
ages resulting from defendant's misrepresentations as a
whole, and not for the aggregate of distinct and independ-
ent items on account of various misrepresentations consid-
ered severally." 37 And in Jones v. Ford,8  it was held that it
was not error to refuse to submit to the jury special inter-
rogatories where the proposed questions do not call for
findings of fact which would determine any issue in the
case.
In an Illinois case, the plaintiff brought an action to re-
cover damages for the flooding of certain land consisting of
six detached pieces; and the court held that special inter-
rogatories requiring the jury to find the damage done to
each piece according to the natural or artificial divisions
thereof were not proper, because they required no answer
inconsistent with the general verdict.3 9 It has also been
held in the same, jurisdiction that it is not requisite that
the trial court propound a special interrogatory, unless it
relates to ultimate facts of such character that it would
control a general verdict.
40
A special interrogatory is improperly submitted to the
jury where the answer thereto cannot control the general
verdict.41 And the United States Supreme Court, in a case
arising in Oklahoma, affirmed the judgment of the state
court, in holding that the trial court need not require the
jury to answer a special interrogatory which inquires into
a fact only incidental to the issue, and, if the special ques-
tion tendered is immaterial or confusing, it should be re-
jected.42
87 122 Iowa 59, 96 N. W. 983 (1903).
- 164 Ia. 549, 134 N. W. 569, 88 L. P. A. (N. S.) '777 (1912).
29 Smith v. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 260 I1. 463, 103 N. E. 254 (1918).
40 Springfield Coal Mn. Co. v. Gedutis, 227 Ill. 9, 81 N. E. 0 (1907).
41 Chicago & Alton Ry. Co. v. Seevers, 122 Ill. App. 658 (1905); Second Nat.
Bank v. Gibboney, 43 Ind. App. 492, 87 N. E. 1064 (1909) ; Moss v. Detroit & Makinac
By. Co., 182 Mich. 40, 148 N. W. 204 (1914).
" Drumm=Flato Commission Co. v. Edmission, 17 Okla. 844, 87 Pc. 811. 28 Sup. Ct.
86, 208 U. S. 534 (1908).
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In the brief compass of this note, it has been possible to
review only a few of the decisions of a comparatively small
number of courts which have had to deal with special in-
terrogatories; but from a brief review such as here under-
taken, and bearing in mind that the problem herein dis-
cussed is statutory in nature, the conclusion that may well
be reached is that the practice noted in recent de-
cisions of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals not
only indicates a departure from the rule of construction
applied to the statute permitting special initerrogatories,
previously well settled in this state, but also that perhaps
it may not be strictly in accord with the adjudications of
the courts of most of the other states having similar statu-
tory provisions.
-G. D. H.
DIVORCE--EFFECT OF GENERAL AND PENAL RESTRICTIONS ON
EXTRATERRITORIAL SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGES OF DIVORCED
PERSONS.-The West Virginia Code provides that neither
party to a divorce suit shall again marry until six months
after the date of the decree, except to each other, and that
the court has the power to decree that the guilty p rty
shall not again marry for such period after the date of the
decree as the court shall deem wise, provided that it be not
over five years. It is further provided that if either of the
parties shall marry within the prohibited periods, except to
each other, the marriage shall be void, and the party shall
be criminally liable as if no divorce had been granted.'
These drastic provisions when the restricted party does mar-
ry in defiance of the court should be especially noted. Af-
ter the expiration of one year from the date of the decree
the court may modify the restraint imposed on the guilty
party if good reason is shown for such action.2
The restrictions to prevent divorced persons marrying
again after a decree granted fall within two distinct class-
es,-one, the same time restriction is put on both parties
regardless of guilt; and two, the restriction is imposed only
on the guilty party. These have been handled so differ-
ently in the various jurisdictions that they are best hand-
' W. VA. CODE, 1923, c. 64, §14.
2 Supra, n. 1.
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